縱使我接受你的觀點，而且承認對禱告的回應在理論上是說得通的，我還是認為它們是絕對不可能的。我不相信，神會需要那些從我們人類來的不了解狀況(而且矛盾)的建言來運轉這個世界。正如你所說的，假設祂是全知的神，難道祂不是已經知道什麼是最好的？而且假設祂是全善的，不管我們祈不祈求，祂不就是這麼做了嗎？
在近百年中，這一個對禱告持著相反看法的提問，嚇壞了許多人。通常的回答是：它只是針對著那一類最低層次的禱告，那種只有一廂情願的祈求。據說，比較高檔的禱告，沒有跟神建議，只是跟祂溝通溝通；那些持有這種看法的人，好像暗示：較低檔的禱告，是胡說八道，只有小孩子和野蛮人才那樣子做。
我從不滿意這種看法。這兩類禱告的區別是很明顯的；整體說來(我不很肯定)，那一類不要求任何東西的，是比較高檔或更先進的。當你能和神的旨意一致，而不要去改變事件的過程——縱使你可以那樣子做；這樣子的意境，當然是一個很高或先進的狀況了。
不過，假使有人這麼簡單的把低檔的排除在外，馬上就出現了兩個難題：首先，他必須說：整個歷史傳統的基督徒的禱告(包括主禱文本身)都是錯的；因為它一直容許祈求日用的飲食，病患得康復，免受敵害的保護，外界的轉化，等等。
其次，雖然另一類的禱告或許比較高檔，假如你侷限自己只做這種禱告，是因為你已經沒有使用其他類的禱告的慾望；關於不去做祈求類的禱告，只因為你認為他們是沒用的，這就沒什麼特別
“高級” 或“屬靈的”。假如一個男孩從不要求蛋糕，因為他是如此的高品味和屬靈的，他不要任何蛋糕，這或許是個好事(不過我還是很不確定)。但是，一個男孩從不要求蛋糕，因為他已經知道要也沒有用，這就沒什麼特別叫好的了。
反對祈求禱告(我指“低檔”或老式的那一類)的說法是這樣的：你所祈求的東西或者是好的——對你和全世界一般說來——或者不是好的。假如它是好的，一個美善全知的神，不論如何就會去做它；假如它是不好的，祂就不做它。你的禱告兩邊都不起作用。要是這種論調是正確的，它不但可以用來反對禱告，不也可以用來反對做任何事嗎？
在每個作為裡，正如在每個禱告上，你都試著要帶出某種結果；這結果有好有壞。那為什麼我們不像禱告的反對者那樣說：假如預期的結果是好的，用不著你的干擾，神就會讓它通過；假如它是不好的，不管你做什麼，祂都不會讓它發生，不是嗎？為什麼要洗手？假如神要它們乾淨，你不用洗，它們也會變得乾淨。假使祂不想讓它們乾淨，它們會仍舊污穢
(如同麥克白夫人 Lady MacBeth發現的) ——不管你洗了多少肥皂。所以為什麼要鹽巴? 為什麼要穿鞋? 為什麼要做事?
我們知道，我們可以有作為，我們的作為會產生結果。所以每個信神的人必須承認(和禱告的問題大不相同)，神並沒有選擇用祂的手來寫整本歷史。宇宙裡進行的絕大部分的事情的確不是我們所能控制，但並非全部。就像在一部戲劇裡，作者決定了場景和故事的大致輪廓，但是某些小的細節就留著讓演員們即興發揮。祂為什麼居然會讓我們去導致實際事件的發生，或許是個謎，但是祂會讓我們藉著禱告去導致那些事情的發生而非藉著其他的方式，更是不可思議。
巴斯卡Pascal說：「神設定了禱告，為的是使祂的所造物能有因果關係裡的尊嚴。」如果說成：祂為了那個目的，發明了禱告和實際行動，或許更加真實。祂把體面給了我們小小的被造物，使我們能經由兩個不同方式，參與到事件的過程。祂使得我們對宇宙的事情能(在那些極限裡) 有所作為；這就是為何我們可以洗我們自己的手，而且可以餵養或謀害我們的同胞。同樣地，祂定下了祂自己的歷史計畫或情節，使得它容許多少數量的自由發揮，而且可以因應我們的禱告而可以有所修改。假如祈求打勝仗
(在戰場上神應該是知道得最清楚的) 是愚蠢而且放肆，那麼穿上雨衣也應該是同等的愚蠢和放肆—— 神不也是最清楚你是否該濕淋淋的嗎？
能使我們導致事件發生的兩種方法，可以稱為作為和禱告。兩者在這一方面是一致的—— 我們試著經由兩者來造成一種事態，這個事態，神不 (或無論如何尚未) 認為應該“由祂自己”來提供。從這個觀點來看，古訓“作為就是禱告laborare est orare”呈現出一個新的含義。當我們在田裡鋤草的作為，和我們祈求豐收的作為是沒有什麼太大的不同。但是有一個不同點，對兩者都很重要。
無論你怎麼努力耕種田地，你無法確定是否有豐收。但是你可以確定，假如你拔了一棵野草，田裡就少了那一棵野草。你可以確定，假如你喝了過量的酒精，一定會毀了你的健康；或者，假如你們持續好幾個世紀，不斷的透過戰爭和奢華的浪費地球的資源，你們將會縮短整個人類的生命。
我們藉著作為所演練出的因果關係，可以這麼說，是神確定的，所以是無情的。藉著它我們為所欲為可以盡情的殘害我們自己。但是這種藉著禱告所演練出的因果關係，就不像那樣；神給自己預留裁量權。假如祂不這麼做，禱告會是一種過度危險而不適於人類的活動，而且會出現像韋納爾Juvenal所預見的可怕的事態：「這種過份的祈求，老天爺也只好憤怒的應允了。」
禱告不常得到 —— 按著粗糙實質的字義 —— “應允”。這並不是因為禱告是一種較弱的因果關係，反而因為是較強的那類。當它一旦成就時，它不受時空的限制。這就是為什麼神要保留應允或拒絕的裁量權；除了那禱告是要毀滅我們的例外情況。當一位校長說：「根據校規，你們可以做這些事情；但是某些其他的事情因為太危險了，所以不能當成普通規條處理。假如你要做那些事情，你必須來申請，在專案裡告訴我整件事的來龍去脈；然後——我們再看要怎麼辦。」不能說他不講理。
Even if I
grant your point and admit that answers to prayer are theoretically possible, I shall
still think they are infinitely improbable. I don’t think it at all likely that
God requires the ill-informed (and contradictory) advice of us humans as to how
to run the world. If He is all-wise, as you say He is, doesn’t He know already
what is best? And if He is all-good, won’t He do it whether we pray or not?
This is the
case against prayer which has, in the last hundred years, intimidated thousands
of people. The usual answer is that it applies only to the lowest sort of
prayer, the sort that consists in asking for things to happen. The higher sort,
we are told, offers no advice to God; it consists only of “communication”…with
Him; and those who take this line seem to suggest that the lower kind of prayer
really is an absurdity and that only children and savages would use it.
I have
never been satisfied with this view. The distinction between the two sorts of
prayer is a sound one; and I think on the whole (I am not quite certain) that
the sort which asks for nothing is the higher or more advanced. To be in the
state in which you are so at one with the will of God that you wouldn’t want to
alter the course of events even if you could is certainly a very high or
advanced condition.
But if one
simply rules out the lower kind, two difficulties follow. In the first place,
one has to say that the whole historical tradition of Christian prayer
(including the Lord’s Prayer itself) has been wrong; for it has always admitted
prayers for our daily bread, for the recovery of the sick, for protection from
enemies, for the conversion of the outside world, and the like. In the second
place, though the other kind of prayer may be “higher” if you restrict yourself
to it because you have got beyond the desire to use any other, there is nothing
especially “high” or “spiritual” about abstaining from prayers that make
requests simply because you think they’re no good. It might be a pretty thing (but,
again, I’m not absolutely certain) if a boy never asked for cake because he was
so high-minded and spiritual that he didn’t want any cake. But there’s nothing
especially pretty about a boy who doesn’t ask because he has learned that it is
no use asking. I think that the whole matter needs reconsideration.
The case
against prayer (I mean the “low” or old-fashioned kind) is this: The thing you
ask for is either good — for you and for the whole world in general — or else it is not. If it is, then a
good and wise God will do it anyway. If it is not, then He won’t. In neither
case can your prayer make any difference. But if this argument is sound, surely
it is an argument not only against praying, but against doing anything
whatever?
In every
action, just as in every prayer, you are trying to bring about a certain
result; and this result must be good or bad. Why, then, do we not argue as the
opponents of prayer argue, and say that if the intended result is good, God
will bring it to pass without your interference, and that if it is bad, He will
prevent it happening whatever you do? Why wash your hands? If God intends them
to be clean, they’ll come clean without your washing them. If He doesn’t,
they’ll remain dirty (as Lady MacBeth found) however much soap you use. Why ask
for the salt? Why put on your boots? Why do anything?
We know
that we can act and that our actions produce results. Everyone who believes in
God must therefore admit (quite apart from the question of prayer) that God has
not chosen to write the whole history with His own hand. Most of the events
that go on in the universe are indeed out of our control, but not all. It is
like a play in which the scene and the general outline of the story is fixed by
the author, but certain minor details are left for the actors to improvise. It
may be a mystery why He should have allowed us to cause real events at all, but
it is no odder that He should allow us to cause them by praying than by any
other method.
Pascal says
that God “instituted prayer in order to allow His creatures the dignity of
causality.” It would perhaps be truer to say that He invented both prayer and
physical action for that purpose. He gave us small creatures the dignity of
being able to contribute to the course of events in two different ways. He made
the matter of the universe such that we can (in those limits) do things to it;
that is why we can wash our own hands and feed or murder our fellow creatures.
Similarly, He made His own plan or plot of history such that it admits a
certain amount of free play and can be modified in response to our prayers. If
it is foolish and impudent to ask for victory in war (on the ground that God
might be expected to know best), it would be equally foolish and impudent to
put on a raincoat — does not God know best whether you ought to be wet or dry?
The two
methods by which we are allowed to produce events may be called work and
prayer. Both are alike in this respect – that in both we try to produce a state
of affairs which God has not (or at any rate not yet) seen fit to provide “on
His own”. And from this point of view the old maxim laborare est orare (work is prayer) takes on a new meaning. What we
do when we weed a field is not quite different from what we do when we pray for
a good harvest. But there is an important difference all the same.
You cannot
be sure of a good harvest whatever you do to a field. But you can be sure that
if you pull up one weed that one weed will no longer be there. You can be sure
that if you drink more than a certain amount of alcohol you will ruin your
health or that if you go on for a few centuries more wasting the resources of
the planet on wars and luxuries you will shorten the life of the whole human
race. The kind of causality we exercise by work is, so to speak, divinely
guaranteed, and therefore ruthless. By it we are free to do ourselves as much
harm as we please. But the kind which we exercise by prayer is not like that;
God has left Himself discretionary power. Had He not done so, prayer would be
an activity too dangerous for man and should have the horrible state of things
envisaged by Juvenal: “Enormous prayers which Heaven in anger grants.”
Prayers are
not always — in the crude,
factual sense of the word — “granted.” This is not because prayer is a weaker kind of
causality, but because it is a stronger kind. When it “works” at all it works
unlimited by space and time. That is why God has retained a discretionary power
of granting or refusing it; except on that condition prayer would destroy us.
It is not unreasonable for a headmaster to say, “Such and such things you may
do according to the fixed rules of this school. But such and such other things
are too dangerous to be left to general rules. If you want to do them you must
come and make a request and talk over the whole matter with me in my study. And
then — we’ll see.”
