配得尊重

我的同學，以前自稱薛呆呆(我是他的鄰號，叫林呆呆)，現在教友們都叫他薛長老，非教友們都稱他薛博士。今天一大早，我在臉書Facebook上看到他的長達一個鐘頭的主日講道，主題是當父母、長輩的要配得子女、晚輩的尊重。他引用了聖經，以弗所書裡面的一節經文「你們作父親的，不要惹兒女的氣，只要照著主的教訓和警戒養育他們。」

我們念聖經每次念到這一句，總有人要發問：「當父母親的，不要惹兒女生氣？這是怎麼說的？豈不是天地顛倒了嗎？」我們薛長老在他的講道裡，解釋，引用例證，說明得非常淋漓透徹，我不想在這裡重述，你們可以自己看個明白。

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=keQn3j0zNNY

薛長老在講道時，引用了麥克阿瑟將軍Gen. Douglas MacArthur為他的兒子所做的祈禱文，我個人認為薛長老的中文翻譯得非常的傳神，我本來想把他的翻譯，紀錄在這兒和大家共享；後來發現吳奚真教授曾經翻譯了這篇祈禱文，而且被收錄在台灣的國中國文第三冊裡。梁實秋曾經評論吳奚真教授的翻譯著作：「於閱讀中文譯本後，發現中文譯本甚為忠實可靠，而且原文複雜之句往往能以熟練之文具法扼要表達之。如此老練譯筆，洵屬一時無兩。」所以下面是吳奚真教授和我的中文翻譯。

A Prayer For My Son為我的兒子的禱告

Build me a son, O Lord, who will be strong enough to know when he is weak, and brave enough to face himself when he is afraid; one who will be proud and unbending in honest defeat, and humble and gentle in victory.

主啊，請陶冶我的兒子，使他成為一個堅強的人，能夠知道自己什麼時候是軟弱的；使他成為一個勇敢的人，能夠在畏懼的時候認清自己，謀求補救；使他在誠實的失敗之中，能夠自豪而不屈，在獲得成功之際，能夠謙遜而溫和。

主啊！請教導我兒子：

在軟弱時，還能夠堅強自知；

在懼怕時，還能夠勇敢面對；

在認敗時，還能夠威武不屈；

在勝利時，卻仍然謙遜溫和。

Build me a son whose wishes will not take the place of deeds; a son who will know Thee — and that to know himself is the foundation stone of knowledge.

請陶冶我的兒子，使他不要以願望代替實際作為；使他能夠認識主---並且曉得自知乃是知識的基石。

請教導我的兒子：

篤實力行，而不只是空想；

使他認識祢—從而認識他自己，這才是一切知識的開端。

Lead him, I pray, not in the path of ease and comfort, but under the stress and spur of difficulties and challenge. Here let him learn to stand up in the storm; here let him learn compassion for those who fail.

我祈求祢，不要引導他走上安逸舒適的道路，而要讓他遭受困難與挑戰的磨鍊和策勵。讓他藉此學習在風暴之中挺立起來，讓他藉此學習對失敗的人加以同情。

我祈求祢：

不讓他走上逸樂之途，卻將他置於困難及挑戰的壓力與刺激之下；

讓他學著在風暴中站起來，藉此知道同情那些跌倒的人。

Build me a son whose heart will be clear, whose goals will be high; a son who will master himself before he seeks to master other men; one who will reach into the future, yet never forget the past.

請陶冶我的兒子，使他的心地純潔，目標高超;在企圖駕馭他人之前，先能駕馭自己；對未來善加籌畫，但是永不忘記過去。

請教導我的兒子：

有一顆純潔的心、一個高尚的目標;

在企圖指揮別人之前，先學會自制；

在邁向未來之時，卻絕不遺忘過去。

And after all these things are his, give him, I pray, enough of a sense of humor, so that he may always be serious, yet never take himself too seriously. Give him humility, so that he may always remember the simplicity of true greatness, the open mind of true wisdom, and the meekness of true strength.

在他把以上諸點都已做到之後，還請賜給他充分的幽默感，使他可以永遠保持嚴肅的態度，但絕不自視非凡，過於拘執。請賜給他謙遜，使他可以永遠記住真實偉大的樸實無華，真實智慧的虛懷若谷，和真實力量的溫和蘊藉。

在他有了這些美德之後，我祈求祢：

賜給他足夠的幽默感，使他可以經常是嚴肅的，但絕不自視非凡；

賜給他謙虛，使他經常記著：

真正的偉大是單純，

真正的智慧是接納，

真正的力量是溫和。

Then I, his father, will dare to whisper, “I have not lived in vain.”

然後，作為他的父親的我，才敢低聲說道：「我已不虛此生！」

然後，身為父親的我，才敢輕聲的說：

「我並沒有白活。」

隱藏於人性的律的後面的東西

Mere Christianity

C. S. Lewis

1943

Bill Lin 譯

Book I. Right and Wrong As A Clue to The Meaning of The Universe

Chapter 4. What Lies Behind the Law

人性規範的幕後

讓我們總結一下至今所提到的。在石頭和樹和類似的東西的例子裡，我們所謂的自然的定律 ，可能不是任何東西，而只是一種說法。當你說自然是被一些律所管轄，實際上，這可能只是意味著自然界表現出一些方式的行為。所謂的律可能不是真正的東西——任何超越我們所觀察的實際事實的東西。但是在人的例子裡，我們看到的不是如此。人類本性的律，或大是大非的律，必定是超越人類行為的實際事實的某些東西。除了實際事實以外，在這個情形下還有某些東西——一個真正的律，不是我們發明的，而且我們知道，它是我們所應該遵守的。

我現在要來研究，這個律告訴了我們，有什麼關這個我們居住的宇宙的東西。自從人類能夠思考以來，他們一直感到奇怪，這個宇宙到底是什麼，它是怎麼存在的。大致上有兩種看法。第一，有所謂的唯物主義者的看法。持著這種看法的人，認為物質和空間正巧就是存在的，而且是一直存在的，沒有人知道是為什麼；而這物質，照著某些固定的方式活動，很湊巧的，由一種蠕蟲，產生出像我們這樣會思考的生物。在千分之一的機會下，某個東西撞到了我們的太陽，使它產生了行星；在另一個千分之一的機會，生命所需的化學物質，和適當的溫度，在一個行星上湊在一起了，這樣，地球上的物質有了生命；然後經過了一大串的機會，生物進化到像我們這樣的東西。另一種是宗教的看法。(看本章最後一節的註釋) 根據宗教的看法，在宇宙的後面有個很像我們所知的心思意念這樣的東西。那是這麼說的，它是有意識，有目的，有喜好的。在這個看法裡，他造成了宇宙，一部分是我們不知道的目的，但是有一部分的目的，是要造成像他自己的生物——我的意思是，像他自己的具有心思意念。

請不要想成，一個看法在很久以前已經形成了，而另一個看法正慢慢的替代它的地位。任何一個地方，只要有思考的人們，兩種看法都會出現。同時也請注意這一點：你無法以科學的常理來判斷哪一個看法才是對的。科學是由實驗而來。它觀察東西如何表現。每一個長時間流傳下來的科學的陳述，不管看來有多複雜，真的是像這樣，「在1月15日凌晨2:20，我將望遠鏡瞄準到天空的某一部分，看到了如此如此。」或「我把某些分量的這個東西，擺進鍋子裡，將它加熱到這個溫度，它有了如此如此的變化。」不要想成我在說反對科學的言語：我只是在說科學的工作是什麼。越是個科學人，(我相信)他越會同意我，這是科學工作的說法——它也是一個很有用而且是必須的工作。但是東西究竟為什麼在那兒，在科學觀察到的東西的後面是否有什麼東西——一些不同種類的東西——這不是一個科學的問題。假如有“幕後的東西，”人們或是一直無從去知道它，或是它會用另外的方法使人們知曉它自己。有任何這種東西的陳述，和沒有這種東西的陳述，都不是科學可以做出來的。而且真正的科學家不會去做那樣的陳述。一般都是記者或通俗作家，撿到一些希奇古怪的東西，而從教科書裡去找出半生不熟的科學，所搞出來的結果。終究，它實在是屬於常識的事。假若科學真是變得完美到可以知曉整個宇宙中的每一樣東西。「為什麼有一個宇宙？」「為什麼它是這樣的發展下去？」「宇宙有什麼意義？」這些問題，不是明顯的依然存在嗎？

若非是因為以下要談的，這個處境就十分絕望了。在整個宇宙中還有一樣東西，只有一樣，我們可以從它了解，比從外在的觀察所得知的，更多的答案。這一樣東西就是人類。我們不僅僅是觀察人，我們也是人。如此說來，在這情況下，我們享有內部的資料；我們是在知道的那一方。因為如此，我們知道，人們發現他們受到一個不是他們所制定的道德律的管轄，想丟也丟不掉，而且知道他們應該去遵守。注意下面這一點：任一東西，從外界來研究人類，如同我們在研究電流或包心菜，不懂得我們的語言，結果是無法從我們得到任何內在的資料，只是觀察我們的作為，就無法得到一絲絲我們有這個道德律的證據。因為它的觀察只顯示了我們的作為，但是道德律是關於我們應該做什麼的。同樣的，假如有任何東西超越或隱藏於我們所觀察的事實的後面，例如石頭或氣候，我們從外界來觀察它們，可能永遠沒有希望去發現它。

然後，這個問題演變成這樣。我們要知道，或許這個宇宙只是湊巧，毫無理由的變成是這樣子，或是後面有一股力量，把它造成這樣。因為這力量假如是存在的，將不會是所觀察的事實之一，而是造成這些現象的實際，單單查看這些事實是無法發現它的。只有在一種情況裡，我們可以知道是否有多出來的東西，那就是我們自己的案例。而且在這一個案例裡，我們發現有它的存在。或者從另一方面來看：假如在宇宙的外面，有這麼一個控制的力量，它不能像宇宙中的一個事實一樣的對我們顯示它自己——正如在那個屋子裡的一面牆，或樓梯，或壁爐，不可能是建造這房子的建築師。唯一我們能期望它來顯示自己的，只有是呈現在我們自己裡面的一種影響或一個命令，試著使我們依某種方式來為人處世。那也正是在我們自己裡面所發現的。這不應該會引起我們的懷疑嗎？在唯一你期望能得到答案的案例裡，這答案竟然是“是的”；而在其他的案例裡，你得不到一個答案，你知道為什麼你得不到答案了吧！假設某人問我，當我看到一個穿著藍色制服的人，沿著街道下去，挨家挨戶的分發小紙袋，為什麼我會知道那些袋子裡裝的是信件？我會回答：「因為每次他留給我類似的小袋子，我都發現裡面有一封信。」假如他反駁：「但是你又沒看到，你所想像的其他人收到的這些信，」我會說：「當然沒有，而且也休想要有，因為它們又不是要寄給我的，我是藉著我可以打開的袋子，來解釋我不可以打開的袋子。」對這個問題來說，它是一樣的。我被允許打開的唯一袋子就是“人”。當我這樣做的時候，特別是當我打開了這個特殊的人，叫做“我自己”的時候，我發現，我並非自我存在，而是受到一個律的管轄；那某人或某樣東西要我依某種方式來為人處世。當然，我並沒有想到假如我能夠進入一個石頭或一棵樹的裡面，我會發現確切相同的東西，正如我不會去想像，所有其他住在這條街的人會收到跟我相同的信件。我會期望，譬如，發現石頭必須遵守萬有引力——而寄給我那些信的，只告訴我要遵守我的人類本性的律，祂強迫石頭遵守石頭的本性的律。但是我會期望去發現，在這兩個案例裡，有一個寄出那些信的，一個“力量”隱藏在事實的後面，像一個指揮，或一個嚮導。

不要把我給想過頭了。我們現在離開基督教的神學的神還有十萬八千哩。我所有提到的是一個指揮整個宇宙的“某些東西”，在我看來是個律，督促我做對的事情，當我做不對時，它使我感覺到該負的責任和不舒服。我想我們必須臆測，和我們所知道的其他東西相比，它比較像個心思意念——因為究竟我們所知道的其他的東西只是物質，你幾乎不可能像信物質會下指令的。當然它不需要很像一個心思意念，但是還不很像一個人。在下一章，我們就可以看到，我們是否可以發現更多有關於它的東西。只是先提醒你們一下，在近百年來，有許多有關神的奉承阿諛的說法。那不是我要說給你們聽的。你們可以斷了那個念頭。

[註] —— 當時為了要使這段簡短到適合廣播，我只提到了唯物論者和宗教的看法。如果要更完整，我應該提到一個中間的看法，稱為生命力哲學，或創造性的進化論，或突現進化論。有關這個說法，最風趣的解說出自於蕭伯納Bernard Shaw的作品，但是最深奧的是伯格森Bergson的著作。持著這種說法的人認為，在這個行星上面的生命，從最低級的樣式，“進化”到人類，並非偶然的，而是因為一個生命力的“努力”或“立意”。當人們這麼說的時候，我們必須問他們，他們所謂的生命力，是不是有一個心意。假如他們認為是的話，那麼“一個使生命存活，而且帶領它到完全的境地”實際上就是神，所以他們的說法本來就是宗教的。假如他們不是，然後說那東西無心的“努力”或“立意”，到底是什麼意思？依我看來對他們是個致命傷。為什麼很多人認為創造性的進化論是如此的吸引人，是因為它給人很大的信神的舒適感，而沒有半點的不愉快的結果。當你覺得很健康，陽光燦爛，而且你不要相信整個宇宙只是一堆機械式跳躍的原子，能夠想到這個偉大的神秘力量，滾過好幾個世紀的時間，把你帶到它的頂峰，真是多麼的美好。另一方面，假如你要去做某些蠻卑劣的事，這個只是盲目的，沒有道德律，沒有心意的生命力量，將不會像那個我們從小就知道的討厭的神那樣，來干涉你。這生命力是像個柔順的神。你要它時，開關一開它就來，卻不會使你厭煩。你可以享有所有宗教的刺激，卻不須有代價。生命力難道不是這世界上迄今最偉大的如意算盤的成就嗎？

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Let us sum up what we have reached so far. In the case of stones and trees and things of that sort, what we call the Laws of Nature may not be anything except a way of speaking. When you say that nature is governed by certain laws, this may only mean that nature does, in fact, behave in a certain way. The so-called laws may not be anything real-anything above and beyond the actual facts which we observe. But in the case of Man, we saw that this will not do. The Law of Human Nature, or of Right and Wrong, must be something above and beyond the actual facts of human behavior. In this case, besides the actual facts, you have something else-a real law which we did not invent and which we know we ought to obey.

I now want to consider what this tells us about the universe we live in. Ever since men were able to think, they have been wondering what this universe really is and how it came to be there. And, very roughly, two views have been held. First, there is what is called the materialist view. People who take that view think that matter and space just happen to exist, and always have existed, nobody knows why; and that the matter, behaving in certain fixed ways, has just happened, by a sort of fluke, to produce creatures like ourselves who are able to think. By one chance in a thousand something hit our sun and made it produce the planets; and by another thousandth chance the chemicals necessary for life, and the right temperature, occurred on one of these planets, and so some of the matter on this earth came alive; and then, by a very long series of chances, the living creatures developed into things like us. The other view is the religious view. (See Note at the end of this chapter.) According to it, what is behind the universe is more like a mind than it is like anything else we know.

That is to say, it is conscious, and has purposes, and prefers one thing to another. And on this view it made the universe, partly for purposes we do not know, but partly, at any rate, in order to produce creatures like itself-I mean, like itself to the extent of having minds. Please do not think that one of these views was held a long time ago and that the other has gradually taken its place. Wherever there have been thinking men both views turn up. And note this too. You cannot find out which view is the right one by science in the ordinary sense. Science works by experiments. It watches how things behave. Every scientific statement in the long run, however complicated it looks, really means something like, "I pointed the telescope to such and such a part of the sky at 2:20 A.M. on January 15th and saw so-and-so," or, "I put some of this stuff in a pot and heated it to such-and-such a temperature and it did so-and-so." Do not think I am saying anything against science: I am only saying what its job is. And the more scientific a man is, the more (I believe) he would agree with me that this is the job of science- and a very useful and necessary job it is too. But why anything comes to be there at all, and whether there is anything behind the things science observes-something of a different kind-this is not a scientific question. If there is "Something Behind," then either it will have to remain altogether unknown to men or else make itself known in some different way. The statement that there is any such thing, and the statement that there is no such thing, are neither of them statements that science can make. And real scientists do not usually make them. It is usually the journalists and popular novelists who have picked up a few odds and ends of half-baked science from textbooks who go in for them. After all, it is really a matter of common sense. Supposing science ever became complete so that it knew every single thing in the whole universe. Is it not plain that the questions, "Why is there a universe?" "Why does it go on as it does?" "Has it any meaning?" would remain just as they were?

Now the position would be quite hopeless but for this. There is one thing, and only one, in the whole universe which we know more about than we could learn from external observation. That one thing is Man. We do not merely observe men, we are men. In this case we have, so to speak, inside information; we are in the know. And because of that, we know that men find themselves under a moral law, which they did not make, and cannot quite forget even when they try, and which they know they ought to obey. Notice the following point. Anyone studying Man from the outside as we study electricity or cabbages, not knowing our language and consequently not able to get any inside knowledge from us, but merely observing what we did, would never get the slightest evidence that we had this moral law. How could he? for his observations would only show what we did, and the moral law is about what we ought to do. In the same way, if there were anything above or behind the observed facts in the case of stones or the weather, we, by studying them from outside, could never hope to discover it.

The position of the question, then, is like this. We want to know whether the universe simply happens to be what it is for no reason or whether there is a power behind it that makes it what it is. Since that power, if it exists, would be not one of the observed facts but a reality which makes them, no mere observation of the facts can find it. There is only one case in which we can know whether there is anything more, namely our own case. And in that one case we find there is. Or put it the other way round. If there was a controlling power outside the universe, it could not show itself to us as one of the facts inside the universe- no more than the architect of a house could actually be a wall or staircase or fireplace in that house. The only way in which we could expect it to show itself would be inside ourselves as an influence or a command trying to get us to behave in a certain way. And that is just what we do find inside ourselves. Surely this ought to arouse our suspicions? In the only case where you can expect to get an answer, the answer turns out to be Yes; and in the other cases, where you do not get an answer, you see why you do not. Suppose someone asked me, when I see a man in a blue uniform going down the street leaving little paper packets at each house, why I suppose that they contain letters? I should reply, "Because whenever he leaves a similar little packet for me I find it does contain a letter." And if he then objected, "But you've never seen all these letters which you think the other people are getting," I should say, "Of course not, and I shouldn't expect to, because they're not addressed to me. I'm explaining the packets I'm not allowed to open by the ones I am allowed to open." It is the same about this question. The only packet I am allowed to open is Man. When I do, especially when I open that particular man called Myself, I find that I do not exist on my own, that I am under a law; that somebody or something wants me to behave in a certain way. I do not, of course, think that if I could get inside a stone or a tree I should find exactly the same thing, just as I do not think all the other people in the street get the same letters as I do. I should expect, for instance, to find that the stone had to obey the law of gravity-that whereas the sender of the letters merely tells me to obey the law of my human nature, He compels the stone to obey the laws of its stony nature. But I should expect to find that there was, so to speak, a sender of letters in both cases, a Power behind the facts, a Director, a Guide.

Do not think I am going faster than I really am. I am not yet within a hundred miles of the God of Christian theology. All I have got to is a Something which is directing the universe, and which appears in me as a law urging me to do right and making me feel responsible and uncomfortable when I do wrong. I think we have to assume it is more like a mind than it is like anything else we know-because after all the only other thing we know is matter and you can hardly imagine a bit of matter giving instructions. But, of course, it need not be very like a mind, still less like a person. In the next chapter we shall see if we can find out anything more about it. But one word of warning. There has been a great deal of soft soap talked about God for the last hundred years. That is not what I am offering. You can cut all that out.

Note -In order to keep this section short enough when it was given on the air, I mentioned only the Materialist view and the Religious view. But to be complete I ought to mention the In between view called Life-Force philosophy, or Creative Evolution, or Emergent Evolution. The wittiest expositions of it come in the works of Bernard Shaw, but the most profound ones in those of Bergson. People who hold this view say that the small variations by which life on this planet "evolved" from the lowest forms to Man were not due to chance but to the "striving" or "purposiveness" of a Life-Force. When people say this we must ask them whether by Life-Force they mean something with a mind or not. If they do, then "a mind bringing life into existence and leading it to perfection" is really a God, and their view is thus identical with the Religious. If they do not, then what is the sense in saying that something without a mind "strives" or has "purposes"? This seems to me fatal to their view. One reason why many people find Creative Evolution so attractive is that it gives one much of the emotional comfort of believing in God and none of the less pleasant consequences. When you are feeling fit and the sun is shining and you do not want to believe that the whole universe is a mere mechanical dance of atoms, it is nice to be able to think of this great mysterious Force rolling on through the centuries and carrying you on its crest. If, on the other hand, you want to do something rather shabby, the Life-Force, being only a blind force, with no morals and no mind, will never interfere with you like that troublesome God we learned about when we were children. The Life-Force is a sort of tame God. You can switch it on when you want, but it will not bother you. All the thrills of religion and none of the cost. Is the Life-Force the greatest achievement of wishful thinking the world has yet seen?

*

餅乾 orange

「你先給我一小塊餅乾，我便回你一小塊餅乾。」

乍看之下，很像是兩小無猜，在那兒分享餅乾，共度美好的童年時光。

No, 不是這麼一回事，這是翻譯C. S. Lewis的成名大作《Mere Christianity》，海天書樓出版的《美哉基督信仰》第一章，第二段裡的一句話。原文是"Give me a bit of your orange, I gave you a bit of mine."

我的女兒從3歲住休斯頓時開始，跟著鄰居的小男孩一起上教堂，後來搬到達拉斯，變成老婆接送，她還是從不間斷的去她自己的教會。到了高中時，有時她的教友們還會到家裡來聚會。對於信仰的事情，我們都是河水不犯井水，相安無事。只是當老爸的有時不免納悶，怎麼女兒不像有些信徒，家裡擺著兩個現成的非信徒，都沒想到要把他們一起拖下水？

當我對什麼是基督教開始認真起來的時候，我碰到了兩個很大的困難，一個是母親告訴我的：「你不可以學他們那樣的說一套做一套…」另一個是耶穌告訴我們的，不可以假冒為善。所以對於什麼才是真正的基督徒，資深的女兒就成了我不恥下問的對象。天才女兒知道怎麼應付不信鬼神的老爸：

(1)把她的NIV版本的聖經送我去念(她再去買一本)；

(2)再送我一本C. S. Lewis的Mere Christianity。

女兒無言的舉動，告訴我三個重點：

(1)不要想從周遭的信徒裡，去找出什麼才是真正的基督徒；

(2)讓一個無神論的教授來告訴你，如何相信有神；

(3)不要一天到晚只念中文的東西。

既然是女兒無言的舉動，她當然不會用她的嘴巴告訴我這三點，這些完全是我自己的領會。而且我一發現C. S. Lewis的Mere Christianity不太好念，我很快的去找了一本中文譯本來念，書名叫《返璞歸真》，後來發現是跟《美哉基督信仰》同一本書，書名不同而已。

Lewis以他是無神論者的過來人的經驗，要把我們引領進有神的世界，所以一開始，他就列舉了幾句耳熟的日常生活爭論的話，告訴我們：「公道自在人心。」

"How'd you like it if anyone did the same to you?"

「如果別人也這樣子搞你，你會喜歡嗎？」

—"That's my seat, I was there first"「那是我的位子，我是先到的。」

—"Leave him alone, he isn't doing you any harm"「由他去吧，他又没傷到你。」

—"Why should you shove in first?" 「你為什麼先動手？」

—"Give me a bit of your orange, I gave you a bit of mine"

「給我一瓣橘子，我以前給過你。」

**「你先給我一小塊餅乾，我便回你一小塊餅乾。」

—"Come on, you promised." 「嘿，你答應過了。」

當年我念到第五句話時，覺得怪怪的，跟前後文不搭調，好像是在做利益交換，而不是在討公道，等我把原文本拿出來一對照：「嚇!怎麼把橘子變成餅乾？」一個頭左愰右愰，就是愰不出個所以然來。這個公案就在我的腦海裡擺了13年，一直到月初，我決定自己來翻譯這本書的時候，差一點又被嚇到兩眼發白。根據原文：

"Give me a bit of your orange, I gave you a bit of mine"

重點不是橘子餅乾，而是前半句用give，後半句用gave。主要的用意是：以前你沒有，我曾經與你分享，今日我沒有，你不應該和我分享嗎？

當年唐三藏到西天取經，不是搬回中原封塵，而是一字一句的翻出正解。我今天花了時間翻譯大師的名著，別無所求，為的也是不要再曲解大師的心意而已。

本性的律的實際

Mere Christianity

C. S. Lewis

1943

Bill Lin 譯

Book I. Right and Wrong As A Clue to The Meaning of The Universe

3. The Reality of the Law

本性的律的實際

現在我要回到在第一章末了所說的，有關人類的兩個怪異的事情。第一，他們被一種他們認為應該要做到的行為的念頭所困擾，你或許可稱它為公平玩法，或正當行為，或道德，或本性的律。第二，事實上他們並沒這樣做。現在你們裡面的某些人或許會懷疑我為什麼稱這個為怪異。你可能認為，這是世界上最自然的事了。特別是，你或許想到我對於人類太苛求了。總之，你可以說，我所謂的違反大是大非的律或本性的律，只意味著人們的不完善。為什麼在這地球上我還要這樣期望他們呢？這會是一個好的答案，假如我正想做的，只不過是要消除，由於我們不去做我們期待別人去做的行為而產生的責難。但是那根本不是我的事。我現在不考慮責難；我只想找出事實。而且從這個某些事情並不完善的想法的觀點來看，關於它的不是所被期待的，是有些後果的。

如果你拿一個東西來說，像一塊石頭或一棵樹，石頭就是石頭，樹就是樹，如果硬說它應該是另一個東西，這種說法看來是沒什麼意義的。假如你想用一個石頭來佈置假山庭園，當然你可以說這一個是“形狀不對”，或稱一棵樹不好，因為它沒有給你所期待的那麼多的遮蔭。但是所有你所意味著的，這個石頭或樹，碰巧不適用於你自己的用途。除非是開玩笑，你並沒有為了這個原因而責怪它們。實際上你知道，在這種氣候和土壤的條件下，這樹是無法長得有什麼不同的。從我們的觀點看來，一棵我們所謂的“壞”樹，是跟 “好”樹一樣，同樣的在遵循自然的定律。

現在你注意到接下來的是什麼嗎？接下來是我們通常所謂的自然定律——例如氣候如何影響一棵樹——嚴格的說可能不真正的是律，但只是一種說話的方式而已。當你說正掉下來的石頭，總是遵循萬有引力定律，和所謂這個律只意味著“石頭總是會這樣的”不會是一樣的吧？你不會真正的以為，當你丟出一塊石頭，它突然想到，它是被命令要掉到地上的。實際上，你只是意味著它會掉下來。換句話說，你不能確定，除了事實本身還有什麼超然的事，任何有關什麼應該發生，而不同於實際上發生的律。自然的定律，應用到石頭或樹，可能只意味著“大自然實際上是如何如何”。但是提到人類本性的律，正當行為的律，是一個不同的事情。這個律並不意味著“人類實際上是如何如何”；因為我以前說過了，他們很多人根本不遵守這個律，沒有一個人是完全遵守的。萬有引力定律告訴你，當你丟開石頭，石頭會怎麼做；但是人類本性的律，告訴你人類該怎麼做卻不做。換言之，當你跟人類打交道的時候，有些在上和超越事實的東西參雜進來了。你有了事實(人怎麼做)，而且你也有其他的某些東西(他們應該怎麼做)。在剩餘的宇宙裡，不需要其他的東西，只需要事實。電子和分子有固定模式的行為，產生了固定的結果，那可能就是全部的故事。(作者註：我不認為它是全部的故事，你等一會兒就知道。但以這個爭論到今日而言，我說它有可能)。但是說人們的行未有一個模式，那並非是全部的故事，因為你知道，在所有的時間裡他們應該有不同的行為。

這真是如此奇特，使得有人禁不住，想要去解釋它。譬如，我們或許要來辨明，當你說一個人的行為不當時，你只是像你在說一個石頭形狀不對時相同的意思；換句話說，是因為他的行為使你感到不便。但是那並不是真實的。一個人坐在車廂內角落的位子，因為他先坐在那兒；另一個人趁著我轉身，在擺行李的時候，溜進來坐了我的位子；這兩人同樣的使我感到不便。但是我只非難那第二個人，而不是對第一個人。一個人不小心絆倒了我，我不生氣——除了或許在我知道是怎麼一回事以前的片刻；我對一個故意要絆我卻沒有成功的人很生氣。雖然第一個人使我受傷而第二個卻沒有。有時候我所謂不好的行為，一點都沒有造成我的不便，卻是正好相反。在戰爭時，各邊可能發現對方有個賣國賊很有用。雖然他們使用他，付他錢，但是把他當成是人類的害蟲。所以你不能說我們稱別人的正當行為，只因為是對我們有用的。至於我們自己的正當行為，我想應該很清楚的，並不是這行為比較有利。它意味著這些事情，正如：當你可以拿到3英鎊，你卻滿足於一半的錢(30 仙令)；可以簡簡單單的作弊，你卻誠實的去作學校的功課，你喜歡去和那女的做愛，你卻放過了她；當你可以到其他比較安全的地方，你卻待在危險的地方；你守了你寧願廢棄的諾言；你說了讓你看來像個傻瓜的誠實話。

有些人說，雖然正當的行為並不意味著對每一個特別的人的一個特別時刻有利，但是，它還是意味著對整個人類有利；所以沒有什麼好神秘的。畢竟人類是有些感覺的；他們看見了，你不能有真正的安全感或快樂，除非你是在一個社會裡，那裡每一個人講究公平，而且是因為他們見到這了這一點，所以他們試著做出正當的行為。當然，這完全是真實的，安全感或快樂只能出自於所有的個人、階級、和國家的誠實，公平和仁慈互相對待。這是世界上一個最重要的真理。但是若要解釋為什麼我們在做大是大非時會這樣想，這個說法就是答非所問了。假如我們問：「為什麼我必須不自私？」你回答：「因為對社會有益。」我們可能追問：「除非它正好對我個人有利，我為什麼要顧慮到對社會有什麼好處？」然後你一定會這麼說：「因為你必須不自私」——這只是把我們又帶回了出發點。你所說的是真的，但是無法再邁前一步。假如有個人被問到為什麼要踢足球，說：「為了要得分」簡直跟沒說好不到哪裡去，因為要得分是這個球賽的本身，而不是玩球賽的原因，所以你只是說足球賽就是足球賽，是不需要說的。假如有個人被問到為什麼要行為正當，說：「為了有益於社會，」也不是好答案，因為想造福社會，或者說不自私(因為"社會"，終究是意味著"他人")，是包含在正當行為裡的一部分；所有你真正表達的是“正當行為就是正當行為”。假如你說到了：「人應該不自私。」就停下來，差不多就是你能說的了。

那也就是我暫停的地方。人們應該不自私，應該公平。並非人們是不自私的，也不是他們喜歡不自私，但是他們必須不自私。道德律，或人類本性的律，不只是有關人類行為的一個表現；正如萬有引力定律或許只是有關物體的輕重的表現。從另一邊來看，它不是單純一個幻想，因為我們無法除掉這個意念，假如真能除掉的話，絕大多數我們所說和所想有關人們的事情，將被縮減到無意義。而且它不是單純一個有關我們如何喜歡人們做出對我們有利的行為的說法；因為我們所謂的不好或不公平的行為，並不完全是使我們不方便的行為，甚至有可能相反。總之，這個大是大非的規矩，或人類本性的律，或是你任意的稱呼，一定多多少少是個真正的東西——一個真正在那裡的東西，不是被我們造出來的。而且還不是在普通感覺裡的一個事實，如同我們的實際行為就是一個事實。看來似乎我們應該開始承認有另一種的實際；在這個特殊的狀況下，有某些東西超越了人類行為的一般事實，還是千真萬確的——一個真正的律，不是我們造的，但卻使我們感到它的催促。

********************************************************

I now go back to what I said at the end of the first chapter, that there were two odd things about the human race. First, that they were haunted by the idea of a sort of behavior they ought to practice, what you might call fair play, or decency, or morality, or the Law of Nature. Second, that they did not in fact do so. Now some of you may wonder why I called this odd. It may seem to you the most natural thing in the world. In particular, you may have thought I was rather hard on the human race. After all, you may say, what I call breaking the Law of Right and Wrong or of Nature, only means that people are not perfect. And why on earth should I expect them to be? That would be a good answer if what I was trying to do was to fix the exact amount of blame which is due to us for not behaving as we expect others to behave. But that is not my job at all. I am not concerned at present with blame; I am trying to find out truth. And from that point of view the very idea of something being imperfect, of its not being what it ought to be, has certain consequences.

If you take a thing like a stone or a tree, it is what it is and there seems no sense in saying it ought to have been otherwise. Of course you may say a stone is "the wrong shape" if you want to use it for a rockery, or that a tree is a bad tree because it does not give you as much shade as you expected. But all you mean is that the stone or tree does not happen to be convenient for some purpose of your own. You are not, except as a joke, blaming them for that. You really know, that, given the weather and the soil, the tree could not have been any different. What we, from our point of view, call a "bad" tree is obeying the laws of its nature just as much as a "good" one.

Now have you noticed what follows? It follows that what we usually call the laws of nature-the way weather works on a tree for example-may not really be laws in the strict sense, but only in a manner of speaking. When you say that falling stones always obey the law of gravitation, is not this much the same as saying that the law only means "what stones always do"? You do not really think that when a stone is let go, it suddenly remembers that it is under orders to fall to the ground. You only mean that, in fact, it does fall. In other words, you cannot be sure that there is anything over and above the facts themselves, any law about what ought to happen, as distinct from what does happen. The laws of nature, as applied to stones or trees, may only mean "what Nature, in fact, does." But if you turn to the Law of Human Nature, the Law of Decent Behavior, it is a different matter. That law certainly does not mean "what human beings, in fact, do"; for as I said before, many of them do not obey this law at all, and none of them obey it completely. The law of gravity tells you what stones do if you drop them; but the Law of Human Nature tells you what human beings ought to do and do not. In other words, when you are dealing with humans, something else comes in above and beyond the actual facts. You have the facts (how men do behave) and you also have something else (how they ought to behave). In the rest of the universe there need not be anything but the facts. Electrons and molecules behave in a certain way, and certain results follow, and that may be the whole story. (*) But men behave in a certain way and that is not the whole story, for all the time you know that they ought to behave differently.

 [*] I do not think it is the whole story, as you will see later. I mean that, as far as the argument has gone up to date, it may be.

Now this is really so peculiar that one is tempted to try to explain it away. For instance, we might try to make out that when you say a man ought not to act as he does, you only mean the same as when you say that a stone is the wrong shape; namely, that what he is doing happens to be inconvenient to you. But that is simply untrue. A man occupying the corner seat in the train because he got there first, and a man who slipped into it while my back was turned and removed my bag, are both equally inconvenient. But I blame the second man and do not blame the first. I am not angry-except perhaps for a moment before I come to my senses-with a man who trips me up by accident; I am angry with a man who tries to trip me up even if he does not succeed. Yet the first has hurt me and the second has not. Sometimes the behavior which I call bad is not inconvenient to me at all, but the very opposite. In war, each side may find a traitor on the other side very useful. But though they use him and pay him they regard him as human vermin. So you cannot say that what we call decent behavior in others is simply the behavior that happens to be useful to us. And as for decent behavior in ourselves, I suppose it is pretty obvious that it does not mean the behavior that pays. It means things like being content with thirty shillings when you might have got three pounds, doing school work honestly when it would be easy to cheat, leaving a girl alone when you would like to make love to her, staying in dangerous places when you could go somewhere safer, keeping promises you would rather not keep, and telling the truth even when it makes you look a fool.

Some people say that though decent conduct does not mean what pays each particular person at a particular moment, still, it means what pays the human race as a whole; and that consequently there is no mystery about it. Human beings, after all, have some sense; they see that you cannot have real safety or happiness except in a society where every one plays fair, and it is because they see this that they try to behave decently. Now, of course, it is perfectly true that safety and happiness can only come from individuals, classes, and nations being honest and fair and kind to each other. It is one of the most important truths in the world. But as an explanation of why we feel as we do about Right and Wrong it just misses the point If we ask: "Why ought I to be unselfish?" and you reply "Because it is good for society," we may then ask, "Why should I care what's good for society except when it happens to pay me personally?" and then you will have to say, "Because you ought to be unselfish"-which simply brings us back to where we started. You are saying what is true, but you are not getting any further. If a man asked what was the point of playing football, it would not be much good saying "in order to score goals," for trying to score goals is the game itself, not the reason for the game, and you would really only be saying that football was football-which is true, but not worth saying. In the same way, if a man asks what is the point of behaving decently, it is no good replying, "in order to benefit society," for trying to benefit society, in other words being unselfish (for "society" after all only means "other people"), is one of the things decent behavior consists in; all you are really saying is that decent behavior is decent behavior. You would have said just as much if you had stopped at the statement, "Men ought to be unselfish."

And that is where I do stop. Men ought to be unselfish, ought to be fair. Not that men are unselfish, nor that they like being unselfish, but that they ought to be. The Moral Law, or Law of Human Nature, is not simply a fact about human behavior in the same way as the Law of Gravitation is, or may be, simply a fact about how heavy objects behave. On the other hand, it is not a mere fancy, for we cannot get rid of the idea, and most of the things we say and think about men would be reduced to nonsense if we did. And it is not simply a statement about how we should like men to behave for our own convenience; for the behavior we call bad or unfair is not exactly the same as the behavior we find inconvenient, and may even be the opposite. Consequently, this Rule of Right and Wrong, or Law of Human Nature, or whatever you call it, must somehow or other be a real thing- a thing that is really there, not made up by ourselves. And yet it is not a fact in the ordinary sense, in the same way as our actual behavior is a fact. It begins to look as if we shall have to admit that there is more than one kind of reality; that, in this particular case, there is something above and beyond the ordinary facts of men's behavior, and yet quite definitely real-a real law, which none of as made, but which we find pressing on us. 

一些異議

Mere Christianity

C. S. Lewis

1943

Bill Lin 譯

Book I. Right and Wrong As A Clue to The Meaning of The Universe

Chapter 2. Some Objections

某些反對的意見

我收到的一些信件顯示 — 很多人認為所謂人類本性的規範，或道德律，或正當行為的規矩很難理解。如果這些是根基部份，我最好停下來，把根基穩固以後再繼續下去。

例如，有人在信裡說：「你所謂的道德律，簡單的說，不就是我們的群體直覺。跟我們所有其他的直覺不都一樣嗎？」現在我不否認我們或許有一個群體直覺；但那不是我所謂的道德律。我們都知道，它感覺起來很像是被本能所促使 — 被母愛，或性本能，或對食物的直覺。它意味著，你感到一個很強的需要或慾望，去做某種方式的行動。當然，我們有時真是感到有那種慾望去幫助另一個人：毫無疑問的，那種慾望是由於群體直覺。但是感覺到有一個慾望去幫忙，和感覺不管要或不要，你都得幫忙，是很不一樣的。假設你聽到一個遭遇危險的人呼叫幫忙。你或許會感到兩個慾望 — 一個慾望要給幫忙(基於你的群體直覺)，另一個慾望要避免危險(基於自保的本能)。但是在你的裡面，除了這兩個衝動以外，有第三個東西，告訴你應該遵循幫忙的衝動，壓抑逃跑的衝動。現在這個東西評斷兩個直覺，決定應該鼓勵哪一個的，它自己不會是兩者之一。你的說法，可能就像一張樂譜告訴你，在某時，要彈鋼琴上的這個鍵而不是那個鍵，然後你說樂譜也是琴上的一個鍵一樣。道德律告訴我們必須彈奏的曲調；我們的本能只是那些琴鍵而已。

由另一個方式，來看道德律不是我們簡單的本能之一是這樣的。如果兩個直覺互相衝突，而這個生物的內心除了那兩個直覺以外沒有別的東西，很明顯的，比較強的那個應該會贏。但是在那些時刻，當我們有很強的道德律的意識時，它經常像是正在告訴我們要站在那兩個衝動的弱的那一方。你或許要安全比要去救那正在溺水的人多很多：但是這道德律還是照常的告訴你要去救人。它是肯定的經常告訴我們，試著去使正確的衝動強過於它本來的嗎？我的意思是，我們經常覺得那是我們的責任去刺激群體直覺，藉著喚醒我們的想像力，引起我們的憐憫等等，來得到足夠的動力，去做對的事情。但是很清楚的，我們並不是從一個直覺去促使一個直覺比原來變得更強。這個東西對你說：「你的群體直覺睡著了。把它弄醒吧，」它本身不可能是群體直覺。那個對你說哪個鋼琴上的琴鍵，應該彈得比較大聲的東西，本身不可能是琴鍵。

這是第三種看法，如果這道德律是我們的本能之一，我們應該可以指出我們裡面的某一個衝動，經常是我們所謂“良善的”，經常符合好行為的規矩。但是沒辦法。我們的衝動裡面，沒有一個是道德律告訴我們經常要抑制的，也沒有一個是告訴我們要經常鼓勵的。如果去想我們有些衝動 — 譬如母愛或愛國心 — 是好的，而其他的，像性本能，或戰鬥本能是不好的，是一個錯誤的想法。我們所有的意思是，戰鬥本能，或性慾需要被節制的場合的確比那些節制母愛或愛國心的場合來得多。但是在有些情況下，鼓勵他的性衝動是一個結了婚的男人的責任，而對一個士兵要鼓勵他的戰鬥本能。也有一些場合，一個母親對她自己的子女的愛，或一個人愛他自己的國家，是需要被抑制的，以免導致對別人的子女或國家的不公平。嚴格的說，沒有所謂的好的或壞的衝動。再想一想鋼琴的例子。它上面沒有所謂的兩種琴鍵，“對的” 琴鍵和“錯的” 琴鍵。每一個琴鍵都是這時對，那時錯。道德律不是一個本能或任一組本能：它是藉著指揮這些本能造成一種和諧(這個和諧，我們稱之為良善或對的行為)的東西。

還有，這一點是有很大的實質後果的。你所能做出的最危險的事，就是把你的自然的任一衝動，當成你必須不記代價去遵循的東西。它們之間沒有一樣不把我們帶進邪惡，假如我們把它塑造成是一個絕對的引導。你或許會想到人道的愛通常是無害的，但並不盡然。如果你拿掉了公義，在遭受考驗的時候，你將發現你自己毀約，作假證據，“為了人道的緣故，”最後變成一個殘酷奸詐的人。

其他的人寫信告訴我：「你所謂的道德律，不就是一個社交慣例，我們藉著教導得來的東西嗎？」我想這裡面有一個誤會。問這個問題的人通常是“想必當然爾”，假如我們從父母老師學到一樣東西，這個東西一定只是個人類所發明的。當然並非如此。我們全都在學校裡學了99乘法表。一個獨自生長在沙漠孤島的孩子就不曉得這個。但是實際上，這並不構成99乘法表只是一個人類的慣例的說法，人類做成了某些東西給自己用，假如他們喜歡的話，他們不也可以把它做得不一樣嗎？我完全同意，正如我們學得其他的每一樣東西，從父母和老師那兒，還有朋友和書本，我們學得正當行為的規矩。但是有些學來的東西只是慣例，它們可能會不一樣 — 我們學了在路上靠左邊走，只是如果規定要靠右邊也可以 — 還有其他的，像數學，是真的事實。問題是，人類本性的律是屬於哪一類。

有兩個理由可以解釋，它和數學是屬於同一類的。第一，像我在第一章裡所說的，雖然道德觀念在不同時代、或不同國家互相之間存有不同，這些相異之處並不很大 — 遠不及大多數人想像的那麼大 — 你可以辨認出相同的律在所有的他們之間運行：而單純的慣例，像在路上靠邊走，或是人們穿的衣著，可以到任一程度的不同。另一個原因是：當你想到在這些民族之間道德的不同時，你有想到一個民族的道德比另一個較好或較差嗎？有任何的差別是改進呢？如果不是的話，當然從未有任何的道德的進步的。進步的意思不只是改變，而是變得更好。假如沒有一組道德觀念是比其他的更真實或更好，所謂的比較喜愛文明人的道德甚於化外人的道德，或基督徒的道德相對納粹的道德，就沒什麼意義了。當然，實際上我們都相信某些道德是比其他的好。我們相信某些人試著改變他們那個時代的道德觀念，就是我們所謂的改革者或先驅 — 這些人理解道德的程度比他們的鄰人們好。就是這樣。當你說有一組道德觀念比另一組更好的時候，實際上，你在用一個標準在衡量它們，你是說它們之中的一個比另一個更符合這個標準。但是這個用來衡量這兩樣東西的又跟這兩者不同。實際上，你在用某個真正的道德來比較它們，你承認有這麼一個東西是一個真正的“大是”，和人們的想法無關，有些人的觀念比其他的人的觀念更接近這個真正的“大是”。或者這麼說。假如你的道德觀念比較真實，而納粹的那些比較不真，那一定有某些東西 — 某個真的道德 — 使它們真不真。為什麼你對紐約的看法會比我的真或不真的理由，是因為紐約是一個真正的地方，存在於我們所想的很遠的地方。假設當我們都說“紐約”時，我們都只是意味著“我的腦子裡所想像的小鎮” ，怎麼可能我們中的一個人會有比較真實的看法呢？決不可能有真或假的問題了。同樣的，假如正當行為的規矩只意味著“每個國家所認定的”，要說哪個國家的認定，一直都比其他任一國家來得正確，那是沒有意義的；要說這世界在道德上將一直演變得更好或更壞也是沒有意義。

我在此做個結論，雖然人們對正當行為的看法有所不同，經常會使你懷疑根本就沒有真正的自然的行為的律，但是我們一去思考有關這些不同的事的時候，卻實際上證明它是存在的。在我結束以前再加一句話。我遇過人們誇大這些不同，那是因為他們他們不能分辨道德的不同，和相信事實的不同。例如，一個人告訴我：「三百年前，在英國，人們把女巫處死。那就是你所謂的人類本性的規矩或大是的行為？」但是確切的理由使我們不再處死女巫，是因為我們不相信有這樣的事。假如我們相信 — 假如我們真的想到有人會去把他們自己賣給魔鬼，而從他得到超自然的力量，轉過來用這些力量來殺害他們的鄰人，或使他們發瘋，或帶來不好的氣候，當然我們會一致同意，如果有人該被判死刑，非這些骯髒的內奸莫屬。在這裡沒有道德原則的差異：一個不同點只是簡單的事實的真相。不相信女巫的存在，在知識上或是一大進步：但是當你們不相信他們的存在，而不處死他們，是沒有什麼道德的進步的。假如一個人因為相信屋子裡沒有老鼠，而不再擺老鼠夾，你們應該不會說他很有慈心吧！

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If they are the foundation, I had better stop to make that foundation firm before I go on. Some of the letters I have had show - that a good many people find it difficult to understand just what this Law of Human Nature, or Moral Law, or Rule of Decent Behavior is.

For example, some people wrote to me saying, "Isn't what you call the Moral Law simply our herd instinct and hasn't it been developed just like all our other instincts?" Now I do not deny that we may have a herd instinct: but that is not what I mean by the Moral Law. We all know what it feels like to be prompted by instinct - by mother love, or sexual instinct, or the instinct for food. It means that you feel a strong want or desire to act in a certain way. And, of course, we sometimes do feel just that sort of desire to help another person: and no doubt that desire is due to the herd instinct. But feeling a desire to help is quite different from feeling that you ought to help whether you want to or not. Supposing you hear a cry for help from a man in danger. You will probably feel two desires-one a desire to give help (due to your herd instinct), the other a desire to keep out of danger (due to the instinct for self-preservation). But you will find inside you, in addition to these two impulses, a third thing which tells you that you ought to follow the impulse to help, and suppress the impulse to run away. Now this thing that judges between two instincts, that decides which should be encouraged, cannot itself be either of them. You might as well say that the sheet of music which tells you, at a given moment, to play one note on the piano and not another, is itself one of the notes on the keyboard. The Moral Law tells us the tune we have to play: our instincts are merely the keys.

Another way of seeing that the Moral Law is not simply one of our instincts is this. If two instincts are in conflict, and there is nothing in a creature's mind except those two instincts, obviously the stronger of the two must win. But at those moments when we are most conscious of the Moral Law, it usually seems to be telling us to side with the weaker of the two impulses. You probably want to be safe much more than you want to help the man who is drowning: but the Moral Law tells you to help him all the same. And surely it often tells us to try to make the right impulse stronger than it naturally is? I mean, we often feel it our duty to stimulate the herd instinct, by waking up our imaginations and arousing our pity and so on, so as to get up enough steam for doing the right thing. But clearly we are not acting from instinct when we set about making an instinct stronger than it is. The thing that says to you, "Your herd instinct is asleep. Wake it up," cannot itself be the herd instinct. The thing that tells you which note on the piano needs to be played louder cannot itself be that note.

Here is a third way of seeing it If the Moral Law was one of our instincts, we ought to be able to point to some one impulse inside us which was always what we call "good," always in agreement with the rule of right behavior. But you cannot. There is none of our impulses which the Moral Law may not sometimes tell us to suppress, and none which it may not sometimes tell us to encourage. It is a mistake to think that some of our impulses- say mother love or patriotism-are good, and others, like sex or the fighting instinct, are bad. All we mean is that the occasions on which the fighting instinct or the sexual desire need to be restrained are rather more frequent than those for restraining mother love or patriotism. But there are situations in which it is the duty of a married man to encourage his sexual impulse and of a soldier to encourage the fighting instinct. There are also occasions on which a mother's love for her own children or a man's love for his own country have to be suppressed or they will lead to unfairness towards other people's children or countries. Strictly speaking, there are no such things as good and bad impulses. Think once again of a piano. It has not got two kinds of notes on it, the "right" notes and the "wrong" ones. Every single note is right at one time and wrong at another. The Moral Law is not any one instinct or any set of instincts: it is something which makes a kind of tune (the tune we call goodness or right conduct) by directing the instincts.

By the way, this point is of great practical consequence. The most dangerous thing you can do is to take any one impulse of your own nature and set it up as the thing you ought to follow at all costs. There is not one of them which will not make us into devils if we set it up as an absolute guide. You might think love of humanity in general was safe, but it is not. If you leave out justice you will find yourself breaking agreements and faking evidence in trials "for the sake of humanity," and become in the end a cruel and treacherous man.

Other people wrote to me saying, "Isn't what you call the Moral Law just a social convention, something that is put into us by education?" I think there is a misunderstanding here. The people who ask that question are usually taking it for granted that if we have learned a thing from parents and teachers, then that thing must be merely a human invention. But, of course, that is not so. We all learned the multiplication table at school. A child who grew up alone on a desert island would not know it. But surely it does not follow that the multiplication table is simply a human convention, something human beings have made up for themselves and might have made different if they had liked? I fully agree that we learn the Rule of Decent Behavior from parents and teachers, and friends and books, as we learn everything else. But some of the things we learn are mere conventions which might have been different-we learn to keep to the left of the road, but it might just as well have been the rule to keep to the right-and others of them, like mathematics, are real truths. The question is to which class the Law of Human Nature belongs.

There are two reasons for saying it belongs to the same class as mathematics. The first is, as I said in the first chapter, that though there are differences between the moral ideas of one time or country and those of another, the differences are not really very great-not nearly so great as most people imagine-and you can recognize the same law running through them all: whereas mere conventions, like the rule of the road or the kind of clothes people wear, may differ to any extent. The other reason is this. When you think about these differences between the morality of one people and another, do you think that the morality of one people is ever better or worse than that of another? Have any of the changes been improvements? If not, then of course there could never be any moral progress. Progress means not just changing, but changing for the better. If no set of moral ideas were truer or better than any other, there would be no sense in preferring civilized morality to savage morality, or Christian morality to Nazi morality. In fact, of course, we all do believe that some moralities are better than others. We do believe that some of the people who tried to change the moral ideas of their own age were what we would call Reformers or Pioneers-people who understood morality better than their neighbors did. Very well then. The moment you say that one set of moral ideas can be better than another, you are, in fact, measuring them both by a standard, saying that one of them conforms to that standard more nearly than the other. But the standard that measures two things is something different from either. You are, in fact, comparing them both with some Real Morality, admitting that there is such a thing as a real Right, independent of what people think, and that some people's ideas get nearer to that real Right than others. Or put it this way. If your moral ideas can be truer, and those of the Nazis less true, there must be something-some Real Morality-for them to be true about. The reason why your idea of New York can be truer or less true than mine is that New York is a real place, existing quite apart from what either of us thinks. If when each of us said "New York" each meant merely "The town I am imagining in my own head," how could one of us have truer ideas than the other? There would be no question of truth or falsehood at all. In the same way, if the Rule of Decent Behavior meant simply "whatever each nation happens to approve," there would be no sense in saying that any one nation had ever been more correct in its approval than any other; no sense in saying that the world could ever grow morally better or morally worse.

I conclude then, that though the differences between people's ideas of Decent Behavior often make you suspect that there is no real natural Law of Behavior at all, yet the things we are bound to think about these differences really prove just the opposite. But one word before I end. I have met people who exaggerate the differences, because they have not distinguished between differences of morality and differences of belief about facts. For example, one man said to me, "Three hundred years ago people in England were putting witches to death. Was that what you call the Rule of Human Nature or Right Conduct?" But surely the reason we do not execute witches is that we do not believe there are such things. If we did-if we really thought that there were people going about who had sold themselves to the devil and received supernatural powers from him in return and were using these powers to kill their neighbors or drive them mad or bring bad weather, surely we would all agree that if anyone deserved the death penalty, then these filthy quislings did. There is no difference of moral principle here: the difference is simply about matter of fact. It may be a great advance in knowledge not to believe in witches: there is no moral advance in not executing them when you do not think they are there. You would not call a man humane for ceasing to set mousetraps if he did so because he believed there were no mice in the house.

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