本性的律的實際

Mere Christianity

C. S. Lewis

1943

Bill Lin 譯

Book I. Right and Wrong As A Clue to The Meaning of The Universe

3. The Reality of the Law

本性的律的實際

現在我要回到在第一章末了所說的，有關人類的兩個怪異的事情。第一，他們被一種他們認為應該要做到的行為的念頭所困擾，你或許可稱它為公平玩法，或正當行為，或道德，或本性的律。第二，事實上他們並沒這樣做。現在你們裡面的某些人或許會懷疑我為什麼稱這個為怪異。你可能認為，這是世界上最自然的事了。特別是，你或許想到我對於人類太苛求了。總之，你可以說，我所謂的違反大是大非的律或本性的律，只意味著人們的不完善。為什麼在這地球上我還要這樣期望他們呢？這會是一個好的答案，假如我正想做的，只不過是要消除，由於我們不去做我們期待別人去做的行為而產生的責難。但是那根本不是我的事。我現在不考慮責難；我只想找出事實。而且從這個某些事情並不完善的想法的觀點來看，關於它的不是所被期待的，是有些後果的。

如果你拿一個東西來說，像一塊石頭或一棵樹，石頭就是石頭，樹就是樹，如果硬說它應該是另一個東西，這種說法看來是沒什麼意義的。假如你想用一個石頭來佈置假山庭園，當然你可以說這一個是“形狀不對”，或稱一棵樹不好，因為它沒有給你所期待的那麼多的遮蔭。但是所有你所意味著的，這個石頭或樹，碰巧不適用於你自己的用途。除非是開玩笑，你並沒有為了這個原因而責怪它們。實際上你知道，在這種氣候和土壤的條件下，這樹是無法長得有什麼不同的。從我們的觀點看來，一棵我們所謂的“壞”樹，是跟 “好”樹一樣，同樣的在遵循自然的定律。

現在你注意到接下來的是什麼嗎？接下來是我們通常所謂的自然定律——例如氣候如何影響一棵樹——嚴格的說可能不真正的是律，但只是一種說話的方式而已。當你說正掉下來的石頭，總是遵循萬有引力定律，和所謂這個律只意味著“石頭總是會這樣的”不會是一樣的吧？你不會真正的以為，當你丟出一塊石頭，它突然想到，它是被命令要掉到地上的。實際上，你只是意味著它會掉下來。換句話說，你不能確定，除了事實本身還有什麼超然的事，任何有關什麼應該發生，而不同於實際上發生的律。自然的定律，應用到石頭或樹，可能只意味著“大自然實際上是如何如何”。但是提到人類本性的律，正當行為的律，是一個不同的事情。這個律並不意味著“人類實際上是如何如何”；因為我以前說過了，他們很多人根本不遵守這個律，沒有一個人是完全遵守的。萬有引力定律告訴你，當你丟開石頭，石頭會怎麼做；但是人類本性的律，告訴你人類該怎麼做卻不做。換言之，當你跟人類打交道的時候，有些在上和超越事實的東西參雜進來了。你有了事實(人怎麼做)，而且你也有其他的某些東西(他們應該怎麼做)。在剩餘的宇宙裡，不需要其他的東西，只需要事實。電子和分子有固定模式的行為，產生了固定的結果，那可能就是全部的故事。(作者註：我不認為它是全部的故事，你等一會兒就知道。但以這個爭論到今日而言，我說它有可能)。但是說人們的行未有一個模式，那並非是全部的故事，因為你知道，在所有的時間裡他們應該有不同的行為。

這真是如此奇特，使得有人禁不住，想要去解釋它。譬如，我們或許要來辨明，當你說一個人的行為不當時，你只是像你在說一個石頭形狀不對時相同的意思；換句話說，是因為他的行為使你感到不便。但是那並不是真實的。一個人坐在車廂內角落的位子，因為他先坐在那兒；另一個人趁著我轉身，在擺行李的時候，溜進來坐了我的位子；這兩人同樣的使我感到不便。但是我只非難那第二個人，而不是對第一個人。一個人不小心絆倒了我，我不生氣——除了或許在我知道是怎麼一回事以前的片刻；我對一個故意要絆我卻沒有成功的人很生氣。雖然第一個人使我受傷而第二個卻沒有。有時候我所謂不好的行為，一點都沒有造成我的不便，卻是正好相反。在戰爭時，各邊可能發現對方有個賣國賊很有用。雖然他們使用他，付他錢，但是把他當成是人類的害蟲。所以你不能說我們稱別人的正當行為，只因為是對我們有用的。至於我們自己的正當行為，我想應該很清楚的，並不是這行為比較有利。它意味著這些事情，正如：當你可以拿到3英鎊，你卻滿足於一半的錢(30 仙令)；可以簡簡單單的作弊，你卻誠實的去作學校的功課，你喜歡去和那女的做愛，你卻放過了她；當你可以到其他比較安全的地方，你卻待在危險的地方；你守了你寧願廢棄的諾言；你說了讓你看來像個傻瓜的誠實話。

有些人說，雖然正當的行為並不意味著對每一個特別的人的一個特別時刻有利，但是，它還是意味著對整個人類有利；所以沒有什麼好神秘的。畢竟人類是有些感覺的；他們看見了，你不能有真正的安全感或快樂，除非你是在一個社會裡，那裡每一個人講究公平，而且是因為他們見到這了這一點，所以他們試著做出正當的行為。當然，這完全是真實的，安全感或快樂只能出自於所有的個人、階級、和國家的誠實，公平和仁慈互相對待。這是世界上一個最重要的真理。但是若要解釋為什麼我們在做大是大非時會這樣想，這個說法就是答非所問了。假如我們問：「為什麼我必須不自私？」你回答：「因為對社會有益。」我們可能追問：「除非它正好對我個人有利，我為什麼要顧慮到對社會有什麼好處？」然後你一定會這麼說：「因為你必須不自私」——這只是把我們又帶回了出發點。你所說的是真的，但是無法再邁前一步。假如有個人被問到為什麼要踢足球，說：「為了要得分」簡直跟沒說好不到哪裡去，因為要得分是這個球賽的本身，而不是玩球賽的原因，所以你只是說足球賽就是足球賽，是不需要說的。假如有個人被問到為什麼要行為正當，說：「為了有益於社會，」也不是好答案，因為想造福社會，或者說不自私(因為"社會"，終究是意味著"他人")，是包含在正當行為裡的一部分；所有你真正表達的是“正當行為就是正當行為”。假如你說到了：「人應該不自私。」就停下來，差不多就是你能說的了。

那也就是我暫停的地方。人們應該不自私，應該公平。並非人們是不自私的，也不是他們喜歡不自私，但是他們必須不自私。道德律，或人類本性的律，不只是有關人類行為的一個表現；正如萬有引力定律或許只是有關物體的輕重的表現。從另一邊來看，它不是單純一個幻想，因為我們無法除掉這個意念，假如真能除掉的話，絕大多數我們所說和所想有關人們的事情，將被縮減到無意義。而且它不是單純一個有關我們如何喜歡人們做出對我們有利的行為的說法；因為我們所謂的不好或不公平的行為，並不完全是使我們不方便的行為，甚至有可能相反。總之，這個大是大非的規矩，或人類本性的律，或是你任意的稱呼，一定多多少少是個真正的東西——一個真正在那裡的東西，不是被我們造出來的。而且還不是在普通感覺裡的一個事實，如同我們的實際行為就是一個事實。看來似乎我們應該開始承認有另一種的實際；在這個特殊的狀況下，有某些東西超越了人類行為的一般事實，還是千真萬確的——一個真正的律，不是我們造的，但卻使我們感到它的催促。

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I now go back to what I said at the end of the first chapter, that there were two odd things about the human race. First, that they were haunted by the idea of a sort of behavior they ought to practice, what you might call fair play, or decency, or morality, or the Law of Nature. Second, that they did not in fact do so. Now some of you may wonder why I called this odd. It may seem to you the most natural thing in the world. In particular, you may have thought I was rather hard on the human race. After all, you may say, what I call breaking the Law of Right and Wrong or of Nature, only means that people are not perfect. And why on earth should I expect them to be? That would be a good answer if what I was trying to do was to fix the exact amount of blame which is due to us for not behaving as we expect others to behave. But that is not my job at all. I am not concerned at present with blame; I am trying to find out truth. And from that point of view the very idea of something being imperfect, of its not being what it ought to be, has certain consequences.

If you take a thing like a stone or a tree, it is what it is and there seems no sense in saying it ought to have been otherwise. Of course you may say a stone is "the wrong shape" if you want to use it for a rockery, or that a tree is a bad tree because it does not give you as much shade as you expected. But all you mean is that the stone or tree does not happen to be convenient for some purpose of your own. You are not, except as a joke, blaming them for that. You really know, that, given the weather and the soil, the tree could not have been any different. What we, from our point of view, call a "bad" tree is obeying the laws of its nature just as much as a "good" one.

Now have you noticed what follows? It follows that what we usually call the laws of nature-the way weather works on a tree for example-may not really be laws in the strict sense, but only in a manner of speaking. When you say that falling stones always obey the law of gravitation, is not this much the same as saying that the law only means "what stones always do"? You do not really think that when a stone is let go, it suddenly remembers that it is under orders to fall to the ground. You only mean that, in fact, it does fall. In other words, you cannot be sure that there is anything over and above the facts themselves, any law about what ought to happen, as distinct from what does happen. The laws of nature, as applied to stones or trees, may only mean "what Nature, in fact, does." But if you turn to the Law of Human Nature, the Law of Decent Behavior, it is a different matter. That law certainly does not mean "what human beings, in fact, do"; for as I said before, many of them do not obey this law at all, and none of them obey it completely. The law of gravity tells you what stones do if you drop them; but the Law of Human Nature tells you what human beings ought to do and do not. In other words, when you are dealing with humans, something else comes in above and beyond the actual facts. You have the facts (how men do behave) and you also have something else (how they ought to behave). In the rest of the universe there need not be anything but the facts. Electrons and molecules behave in a certain way, and certain results follow, and that may be the whole story. (*) But men behave in a certain way and that is not the whole story, for all the time you know that they ought to behave differently.

 [*] I do not think it is the whole story, as you will see later. I mean that, as far as the argument has gone up to date, it may be.

Now this is really so peculiar that one is tempted to try to explain it away. For instance, we might try to make out that when you say a man ought not to act as he does, you only mean the same as when you say that a stone is the wrong shape; namely, that what he is doing happens to be inconvenient to you. But that is simply untrue. A man occupying the corner seat in the train because he got there first, and a man who slipped into it while my back was turned and removed my bag, are both equally inconvenient. But I blame the second man and do not blame the first. I am not angry-except perhaps for a moment before I come to my senses-with a man who trips me up by accident; I am angry with a man who tries to trip me up even if he does not succeed. Yet the first has hurt me and the second has not. Sometimes the behavior which I call bad is not inconvenient to me at all, but the very opposite. In war, each side may find a traitor on the other side very useful. But though they use him and pay him they regard him as human vermin. So you cannot say that what we call decent behavior in others is simply the behavior that happens to be useful to us. And as for decent behavior in ourselves, I suppose it is pretty obvious that it does not mean the behavior that pays. It means things like being content with thirty shillings when you might have got three pounds, doing school work honestly when it would be easy to cheat, leaving a girl alone when you would like to make love to her, staying in dangerous places when you could go somewhere safer, keeping promises you would rather not keep, and telling the truth even when it makes you look a fool.

Some people say that though decent conduct does not mean what pays each particular person at a particular moment, still, it means what pays the human race as a whole; and that consequently there is no mystery about it. Human beings, after all, have some sense; they see that you cannot have real safety or happiness except in a society where every one plays fair, and it is because they see this that they try to behave decently. Now, of course, it is perfectly true that safety and happiness can only come from individuals, classes, and nations being honest and fair and kind to each other. It is one of the most important truths in the world. But as an explanation of why we feel as we do about Right and Wrong it just misses the point If we ask: "Why ought I to be unselfish?" and you reply "Because it is good for society," we may then ask, "Why should I care what's good for society except when it happens to pay me personally?" and then you will have to say, "Because you ought to be unselfish"-which simply brings us back to where we started. You are saying what is true, but you are not getting any further. If a man asked what was the point of playing football, it would not be much good saying "in order to score goals," for trying to score goals is the game itself, not the reason for the game, and you would really only be saying that football was football-which is true, but not worth saying. In the same way, if a man asks what is the point of behaving decently, it is no good replying, "in order to benefit society," for trying to benefit society, in other words being unselfish (for "society" after all only means "other people"), is one of the things decent behavior consists in; all you are really saying is that decent behavior is decent behavior. You would have said just as much if you had stopped at the statement, "Men ought to be unselfish."

And that is where I do stop. Men ought to be unselfish, ought to be fair. Not that men are unselfish, nor that they like being unselfish, but that they ought to be. The Moral Law, or Law of Human Nature, is not simply a fact about human behavior in the same way as the Law of Gravitation is, or may be, simply a fact about how heavy objects behave. On the other hand, it is not a mere fancy, for we cannot get rid of the idea, and most of the things we say and think about men would be reduced to nonsense if we did. And it is not simply a statement about how we should like men to behave for our own convenience; for the behavior we call bad or unfair is not exactly the same as the behavior we find inconvenient, and may even be the opposite. Consequently, this Rule of Right and Wrong, or Law of Human Nature, or whatever you call it, must somehow or other be a real thing- a thing that is really there, not made up by ourselves. And yet it is not a fact in the ordinary sense, in the same way as our actual behavior is a fact. It begins to look as if we shall have to admit that there is more than one kind of reality; that, in this particular case, there is something above and beyond the ordinary facts of men's behavior, and yet quite definitely real-a real law, which none of as made, but which we find pressing on us.